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INTRODUCTION
Imagine spending 1,825 days in one place. That's five years. But not in
Hawaii or California or Paris. This is no vacation. You go to sleep and

wake up every morning staring at the same view of nothingness. You are
left with nothing but your thoughts. After 1,610 days, you can taste the
finish line. With just 215 days to go, you have survived more than 85
percent of your time. You start mentally preparing who you are going to
see, what you are going to do, where you are going to eat your first real
meal. Instead of a countdown that has an end filled with celebration and
freedom, your countdown has no end. There is no timetable, no goal,
nothing to look forward to. You have no idea when this will all end.
This is how Todd Carta felt when in October of 2002 he began serving a
five-year prison sentence. But on March 9th, 2007, the Attorney General
filed a notice of certification that Carta was sexually dangerous and
requested a hearing, thus staying his release and creating no end for his
countdown. More than two years later, on June 4, 2009, a hearing was
finally held before a district judge to determine whether Carta was sexually
dangerous. While serving his jail sentence, Carta never committed an
offense. Yet, he was forced to serve an extra 20 months beyond his fiveyear sentence while he waited to be told that he was not considered
sexually dangerous and was free to go.
One of the most important rights afforded to criminal defendants under
the Constitution is the double jeopardy clause provided by the Fifth
Amendment, which states that, "[no] person [shall] be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' In 2006, Congress
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Political Science, Binghamton University,
2009.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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passed and the President signed into law the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act ("the Act"). The Act allows for inmates to be civilly
committed if the Government can prove they are considered "sexually
dangerous." 2 This provision of the Act allows for a form of double
jeopardy where inmates can be civilly committed without committing a
second sexual offense. 3
This Note addresses the problems presented by 18 U.S.C. § 4248, the
civil commitment statute. 4 Part I provides background information on
criminal sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act and civil
commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. Part II compares the language of
§§ 3553 and 4248 of chapter 18 of the United States Code to illustrate the
similarities between the text of each statute. Part II also examines the
legislative history and goals behind each of these statutes to show were
both enacted to achieve a similar purpose. Part III looks at how §§ 3553
and 4248 are applied by district judges in the case United States v. Carta.
Part III will also highlight the similarities between the criminal sentencing
hearing and civil commitment hearing for Mr. Carta.
This Note argues that the purpose and goals behind § 4248 can be
adequately achieved through the sentencing factors under § 3553. Further,
this Note suggests that as applied § 4248 poses a potential threat to
infringing on criminal defendants' rights under the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The Note provides a resolution for how this
dilemma can be fixed to better serve the nation by eliminating § 4248,
while still providing criminal defendants with their constitutional rights and
serving the intent of Congress. This Note concludes that §§ 3553 and 4248
were enacted to serve similar purposes and thus, no Congressional goals
will be affected by the elimination of § 4248.
I. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL SENTENCING OF SEX OFFENDERS
A. The Sentencing Reform Act
In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.5 The
Crime Control Act's purpose was to "overhaul[] the federal sentencing
system and revise[] bail and forfeiture procedures along with other federal

2 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
3 Id

18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
5 Pub. L.No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
4
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practices." 6 The Sentencing Reform Act ("the Sentencing Act") was one
provision of the Crime Control Act.7 It created the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.8 As part of its responsibilities, the Commission created
factors to consider when imposing a sentence. 9 These factors became
codified into the United States Code, chapter 18, section 3553.10 Until
2005, all of the factors were considered mandatory for federal judges to
follow. Subsequently, in United States v. Booker,11 the Supreme Court held
the mandatory sentencing guidelines, specifically the fourth factor listed in
§ 3553, violated the Sixth Amendment.12 As a result they said the
"[g]uidelines [are] effectively advisory."' 3
There are seven factors considered at sentencing. 14 First, the court
considers the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant."1 5 Second, the court will consider if the
type and length of sentence is necessary.1 6 Specifically, the court will
consider four things: providing just punishment, deterring criminal
conduct, protecting the public from future crimes, and providing training
and treatment for the defendant.17 Third, the court considers what sentences

6 JoAnne O'Bryant & Lisa Seghetti, Crime Control: The FederalResponse, ALMANAC OF POLICY
ISSUES,
Sept.
12,
2002,
available
at
http://www.policyahmanac.org/crime/archive/crsfederal crimejpolicy.shtml.
7 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); see UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN
OVERVIEW

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES

SENTENCING

COMMISSION,

available

at

http://www.ussc.gov/About-theCommission/Overviewof theUSSC/USSCOverview.pdf
(explaining the three purposes of the Sentencing Commission are: "(1) to establish sentencing policies
and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form
and severity of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and assist Congress
and the executive branch in the development of effective and efficient crime policy; and (3) to collect,
analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues,
serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive branch, the courts, criminal justice
practitioners, the academic community, and the public.").
8 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 8. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
challenges to the creation of the Sentencing Act on the basis of a separation of powers argument. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (stating "[w]e conclude that in creating the Sentencing
Commission - an unusual hybrid in structure and authority -- Congress neither delegated excessive
legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate
branches.") Id. at 412.
9 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
10 Id
11 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
12 See Booker 543 U.S. at 220 (holding that section (a)(4) of the Act that makes the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory violated the Sixth Amendment and thus they cannot be considered
mandatory but rather advisory).
13 Id. at 245.
14 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
15 Id. at § 3553(a)(1).
16 Id. at § 3553(a)(2).
17 Id. at § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
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are available.18 Fourth, the court looks at the "kinds of sentences and the
sentencing range established." 19 Fifth, the court considers "any pertinent
policy statement." 20 Sixth, the court factors in "the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records,
who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 21 Finally, the last factor
the court considers is restitution for the victims. 22
These factors are applied in conjunction with the advisory sentencing
guidelines provided to federal judges. Although the guidelines are no
longer mandatory, judges look to the guidelines to provide a framework for
the length of sentence they should give to a criminal defendant. 23 A survey
of judges has indicated that, despite rumors of judges' disapproval of the
guidelines, many of them in fact view the guidelines as extremely
beneficial when they are imposing a sentence on a criminal defendant. 24
Despite the guidelines being ruled advisory, these guidelines and the §
3553 factors are both used during sentencing for criminal defendants.
B. The Adam Walsh Act

At sentencing, a criminal defendant will find out the definitive length of
his or her journey and when it will end, whether in jail or supervised
release. However, those subject to civil commitment are tricked at
sentencing into believing they will be released at a certain point. In 2006,
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act ("the
Act"), which aimed "to protect children from sexual exploitation and
violent crime, to prevent child abuse and child pornography, to promote
Internet safety and to honor the memory of Adam Walsh and other child
18 Id. at §3553(a)(3).
19 Id. at §3553(a)(4). The court will look to "(A) the applicable category of offense committed by
the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines." Id. The court will also consider "(B)
in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy
statements issued by the sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, UnitedStates
Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of
Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the sentencing
Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) or title 28)." Id.
20 Id. at §3553(a)(5).
21 Id. at §3553(a)(6).
22 Id. at §3553(a)(7).
23 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012); see also, Michael Edmund O'Neill and
Linda Drazga Maxfield, JudicialPerspectives on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Goals of
Sentencing: Debunking the Myths, 56 ALA. L. REv. 85, 85 (Fall, 2004) (explaining that federal judges
do not approve of the sentencing guidelines is a longstanding rumor).
24 See O'Neil supra, note 24, at 109 ("[Those on the forefront of sentencing-the judges-largely
appear to have accepted [the guidelines] existence and to embrace them as being beneficial in many
areas.").
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crime victims." 2 5 The Act is divided into seven parts, each implementing a
different way to protect the public, primarily children, from sex
offenders. 26 The Act creates the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act ("SORNA")27 and the Internet Safety Act. 28 The Act also reforms
immigration law to protect children and prevent the use and distribution of
child pornography. 29 In addition, the Act funds programs for children and
community safety. 30 It also increases penalties for those convicted of
sexual offenses against children. 3 1 Finally, the Adam Walsh Act allows for
the civil commitment of "sexually dangerous persons." 32
C. Civil Commitment of Sexually DangerousPersons
Title III of the Adam Walsh Act was created in memory of Jimmy Ryce,
a nine-year old boy who was kidnapped and murdered by a sex offender. 33
This part of the Act became codified into law as 18 U.S.C. § 4248 ("§
4248").34 The statute authorizes the Government to civilly commit those
federal prisoners who are considered "sexually dangerous." 35 If it is
believed the inmate should be civilly committed the Attorney General or
someone authorized by the Attorney General or the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons can certify the inmate as "sexually dangerous." 36 The
certification must be sent to the district court where the person is being
held.37 The court must send the certification to the inmate and the
Government's attorney. 38 Finally, the court "shall order a hearing to

25 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587
(2006).
26 Id.
27 Id.; SORNA's purpose is to establish "a comprehensive national system for the registration of
[sex] offenders." 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). See Robin Morse, Federalism Challenges to the Adam
Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (December 2009). SORNA was also created to ensure that sex
offenders who travel to different states are registered. See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 582
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-218, at 23-24, 26 (2005)).
28 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, §§ 701-707, 120 Stat.
587, 648-50 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
29 Id. at §§ 401-507.
30 See, e.g., id. at § 630 (providing grants for establishing programs on Internet safety for children).
31 Id. at §§ 201 - 216.
32 Id. at § 301; 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (12) (2006) ("Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and
murdered in Florida on September 11, 1995."); 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006) (providing grants for the
"Jimmy Ryce State civil commitment programs for sexually dangerous persons").
34 18 U.S.C. § 4248.
35 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
36 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
37 Id.
38 Id
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determine whether the person is a sexually dangerous person." 39 Section
4248(a) provides no requirements or standards for certification, so long as
the procedures are followed. 40 In essence, the Attorney General has a
tremendous amount of power in the civil commitment scheme. Once the
certification is made and all procedures under § 4248(a) are followed, the
inmate's release will be stayed until a hearing can be held.41
After the release of the prisoner is stayed, the Attorney General must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that such person is "sexually
dangerous." 42 This is a lower standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
which is the standard used to convict the defendant of the underlying
offense. Under the statute, a "sexually dangerous person" is one who "has
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child
molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others." 4 3 For a district judge
to civilly commit a prisoner, the Attorney General must prove both
elements of the definition of a "sexually dangerous person." First, the
inmate must have "engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent
conduct or child molestation." 44 Second, the court must believe the
individual will be "sexually dangerous to others" in the future. 4 5 If the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is sexually
dangerous, the Attorney General will either turn over the inmate to the
appropriate State official or retain custody over the individual. 4 6
Those who may be civilly committed under § 4248 fall into three
categories: (1) those in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"); (2)
those who are incompetent to stand trial and thus committed to the custody
of the Attorney General; and (3) those that have had their charges
dismissed due to their mental condition. 47
Once an individual is civilly committed they begin the next part of their
marathon. They have completed phase one, serving jail time, and now
begin phase two, civil commitment, which has no definitive ending. No
new facts have developed in their criminal record yet their marathon will
continue into a new phase. Those civilly committed will remain in custody
of the State or the Attorney General until the "Director of the facility in
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id
Id
18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).

43 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5).
44 Id.
45 Id
46 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d).
47 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
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which a person is placed" believes that the individual should be released. 4 8
The Director must then "promptly file a certificate to that effect with the
clerk of the court that ordered the commitment." 49 The inmate will be
discharged unless the court or the Government moves for a hearing to
determine if the individual should be released. 50 The hearing is held
"pursuant to the provision of section 4247(d)."51 A "preponderance of the
evidence" standard is applied to determine if release is appropriate. 52 If the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that "he will not be sexually
dangerous to others if released unconditionally, then the court shall order
that he be immediately discharged." 53 Alternatively, if the court finds that
"he will not be sexually dangerous to others if released under a prescribed
regiment of medical psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment," 54 then
several conditions apply. First, the court must "order that he be
conditionally discharged under a prescribed regiment of medical,
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment that has been prepared for
him that has been certified to the court ... and that has been found by the
court to be appropriate." 55 In addition, the court must "order as an explicit
condition of release, that he comply with the prescribed regimen of medical
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment." 56 Assuming the individual
falls within one of these classifications, the court will order his release.
II. Two STATUTES: SAME WORDS, SAME INTENT

When viewed in conjunction with one another, having §§ 3553 and 4248
in the United States Code is unnecessary because the purposes and goals
behind § 4248 are already served under § 3553. Reading the text and
legislative history of both §§ 3553 and 4248, it is clear that the statutes are
duplicative and were intended to achieve the same two goals: protecting the
public and rehabilitating the defendant. If § 4248 had never been codified,
the goals of Congress would have still been achieved because of § 3553.
48 18 U.S.C. §4248(e).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 4247 ("At a hearing ordered pursuant to this chapter the person whose mental
condition is the subject of the hearing shall be represented by counsel and, if he is financially unable to
obtain adequate representation, counsel shall be appointed for him pursuant to section 3006A. The
person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on his
behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing.").
52 18 U.S.C. §4248(e).
53 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(1).
54 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(2).
55 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(2)(A).
56 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(2)(B).
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Thus, the elimination of § 4248 will not defeat Congress' intent because §
3553 will still be codified in the United States Code.
A. The PlainMeaning Says It All
By reading the language of §§ 3553 and 4248, the similarities of both
statutes are obvious. Section 3553 lists the factors that should be
considered when a federal judge imposes a sentence on a criminal
defendant. 57 Among these factors is the need "to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant," 5 8 which is balanced with other factors,
such as the severity of the offense and adequate deterrence. 59 The factors
for civil commitment are not clearly stated in § 4248.60 However, the court
must find by the clear and convincing evidence standard that "the person is
considered sexually dangerous." 6 1 The court that civilly commits the
sexually dangerous person will also follow the guidelines to determine if
release is appropriate. 62 The court must determine by a "preponderance of
the evidence" 63 that the inmate "will not be [a] sexually dangerous
individual to others if released." 64
The text of §§ 3553 and 4248 illustrate that both statutes consider
protecting the public a central motive for both criminal sentencing and civil
commitment. The justification for this motive is apparent; criminals who
are dangerous should not be released. Despite using different language,
each statute requires a judge to consider the harm defendants may cause to
the public upon their release. For example, § 3553 orders a court to
consider the necessity of the sentence "to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant." 65 Similarly, § 4248 requires a court to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "will not be sexually
dangerous to others if released." 66 The potential harm to the public is
considered at sentencing; thus, civilly committing an inmate on the same
grounds is duplicative and unfair.
In addition to protecting the public, both statutes attempt to provide for
the rehabilitation or "curing" of a defendant's inclination toward illegal
57 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
58 Id § 3553(a)(2)(C).
59 See id. § 3553(a)(2).
60 See id. § 4248.
61 Id. § 4248 (d).
62 See id § 4248 (e).
63
6
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
Id. § 4248(e).
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sexual conduct. For example, § 3553 requires a court "to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner." 6 7 Likewise, §
4248 allows a court to release a defendant "if released under a prescribed
regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment." 68
Based on the text of § 3553, the civil commitment statute can be eliminated
and the sentencing factors can be adjusted to provide for a longer sentence
or indefinite parole, therefore accomplishing the same goals of § 4248.
B. CongressionalIntent
In addition to the similar language used in § 3553 and § 4248, both
statutes were enacted by Congress to serve similar purposes. The U.S.
Sentencing Commission established the factors a federal judge considers
when sentencing a criminal defendant in order to "incorporate the purposes
of sentencing (i.e., just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation)." 69 After passing the Sentencing Act, the Senate issued a
report that said, "[a] primary goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of
unwarranted sentencing disparity. The bill requires the judge, before
imposing a sentence, to consider the history and characteristics of the
offender, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the purpose of
sentencing." 70 The Senate Report discusses the four purposes of
sentencing; just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation,
by stating that "[w]hile some of those who have commented on the bill
prefer that one purpose or another be favored over the others . .. the
Committee believes that each of the four stated purposes should be
considered in imposing sentence in a particular case." 7 1 Two of the
Committee's main goals in sentencing reform were to "assure that
sentences are fair both to the offender and to society," 72 and to "assure that
each stage of the sentencing and corrections process ... is geared toward
67 Id. §3553(a)(2)(D).
68 Id §4248(e)(2).
69 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra, note 8. (explaining another goal is to provide

certainty, fairness, and uniformity for offenders with similar characteristics who are convicted of similar
criminal conduct while still allowing judicial flexibility to consider relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors); see also id (discussing the last goal of reflecting how increased knowledge of human behavior
affects the criminal justice process). Cf Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Guidelines and the
UnderlyingPurposes of Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT. R. 326 (May/June 1991) ("And the Commission is
instructed to 'insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant. . . .") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)).
70 S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
71 Id. at 3250-51.
72 Id at 3222.
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the same goals for the offender and for society." 73
Since the passage of § 3553, the creation of the guidelines, and the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker,74 many district court
judges have advocated both for and against the factors and guidelines used
to calculate a sentence. 75 Professor Michael O'Neill, Commissioner of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and Linda Maxfield, Senior Research
Associate of the Office of Policy Analysis for the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, stated that "the district court judges believe that the
guidelines system is putting its greatest energy into discouraging offenders
from committing future crimes." 76 On behalf of the Sentencing
Commission, they surveyed federal judges to "determine whether the
judiciary believed the federal sentencing guidelines have met the goals and
purposes of sentencing."7 7 The results of the survey indicate that "[m]ost
judges perceived that the guidelines successfully provided convicted
offenders with a sentence that accurately specified actual time to be served,
and, in doing so, protected the public from future crimes that these
offenders would otherwise commit." 78 In sum, the purposes of protecting
the public by deterring future crimes and "curing" the criminal are
successfully accomplished when a federal judge sentences the defendant
pursuant to the factors in § 3553.
On July 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. 79 He declared the purpose of the
Act is "to protect our children from exploitation and danger."8 0 One section
of the Act, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
("SORNA"), states that its purpose is "to protect the public from sex
73 Id; see 133 CONG. REC. H10,014, at *H10,018 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987) (explaining that §
3553(a) allows the court to depart from the sentencing guidelines if it finds that the guidelines call for a
sentence that is greater than necessary to serve the purposes of sentencing); see also 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235 (stating that a judge may conclude that the guidelines do not consider an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance and impose a sentence outside the guidelines).
74 See generally 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the federal sentencing guidelines were advisory
rather than mandatory).
75 See generally O'Neill & Maxfield, supra note 24.
76 Id. at 91.
77 Id. at 86.
78 Id at91.
79 See Press Release, The White House, President Signs H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006) available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-6.html. President Bush listed four ways in
which the law builds on the progress of protecting children: (1) expanding the National Sex Offender
Registry; (2) increasing penalties for crimes against children; (3) authorizing task forces charged with
funding and training states to combat sexual exploitation of children on the intemet; and (4) creating a
National Child Abuse Registry. Id
so Id; see Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam
Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REv 697, 702 (2008).
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offenders and offenders against children, and .. . vicious attacks by violent
predators False Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive
national system for the registration of those offenders." 8 1 Another part of
the Act, the civil commitment provision, has been codified into the United
States Code, § 4248.82
Several courts have discussed the Congressional intent behind § 4248
while conducting civil commitment hearings. In United States v. TrilloCerda83 the court said, "[u]nderlying §§ 4241-4248 'is the concept of some
protection to society as well as the preservation of the rights of an accused
person."'84 Later, the court said "[g]iven that by enacting §§ 4241-4248
Congress intended to provide protection for society . . ."85 In United States
v. Abregana86 the court said, "Section 4248 recognizes the federal
government's interest in civilly committing a sexually dangerous person in
its custody with the goal of protecting members of our society from
sexually dangerous acts." 87 Further "there is no clear proof that Congress
intended to create anything other than a civil commitment scheme designed
to protect the public from harm." 88 These two cases are examples of how
Congressional intent to protect the public is considered by courts during a §
4248 hearings.
Although the constitutionality of § 4248 has been challenged, the
Supreme Court upheld it as constitutional in United States v. Comstock.89
The Supreme Court settled the debate over Congress' power to enact the
civil commitment statute, but the Court's reasoning is important. One
factor the majority focused on in ruling in favor of the Government was
"the sound reasons for the statute's enactment in light of the Government's
custodial interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in
federal custody." 90 The Court recognized protecting the public as a main
intent behind the statute, despite not addressing the duplicative nature of
81 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
82 18 U.S.C. §4248 (2006).
83 244 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
84 Id. at 1068 (quoting United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1959)).
85 Id. (citing Barnes, 175 F. Supp. at 65).
86 573 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Haw. 2008).
87 Id. at 1133. The Government argued that it "has a compelling interest in preventing the
commission of crimes by persons in federal custody who present demonstrable dangers." Id. at 1129
(citing Gov. Opp. At 18, Doc. 9).
88 Id. at 1135.
89 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
90 Id. at 1965. ("[A]nd to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be
affected by the federal imprisonment of others.") Id.; see generally Ilya Somin, FederalPower: Taking
Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Limits of FederalPower, 2009-10 CATO.
SUP. CT. REv. 239 (2009-10).
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§4248.
The purpose and legislative history behind §§ 3553 and 4248 indicate
that Congress, in 1984 and 2006, had similar intentions when drafting and
passing each statute. The main theme behind the enactment of both statutes
is public protection from future harms. Each statute also serves to
rehabilitate the criminal, in order to further the goal of preventing future
criminal acts. As a result of the repetitive nature behind the creation of the
criminal sentencing factors and the civil commitment provision, § 4248
could be eliminated. An amendment to the sentencing factors and
guidelines of § 3553 providing for stricter sentences for sex offenses and
indefinite supervised release would serve the same purpose as § 4248.
III. APPLICATION OF §§ 3553 AND 4248 IN UNITED STATES V. CARTA9 1
Defendants subject to sentencing under § 3553 and civil commitment
under § 4248 spend more time in the custody of the Government exceeds
the amount of time they were initially sentenced for the underlying crime.
As a result of pleading guilty to two sexual offenses, Todd Carta was
sentenced for his crimes under § 3553. Before the completion of his
sentence the Attorney General certified him as sexually dangerous under §
4248 before the completion of his sentence. The underlying facts of Mr.
Carta's criminal case are important because they are the exact same facts
used in his civil commitment hearing to determine if he was a sexually
dangerous person. The trial court's reasoning behind Carta's criminal
sentence for Transportation of Child Pornography identified many of the
same goals and objectives that were cited by the court presiding over
Carta's civil commitment hearing.
A. Facts

Todd Carta has been sentenced for one crime in his life. That crime was
the only crime he committed prior to his § 4248 hearing. Carta was the
victim of sexual abuse as a child. 9 2 For more than eight years, beginning
when he was seven years old, Carta was forced to engage in sexual acts
with other children his age, older children, and older men. 93 As a result of
91 United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2009).
92 Id. at 212.
93 Id. While he was seven years old, Carta was ordered by his fifteen year old neighbor to perform
sex acts on another seven-year-old. Id. He was sexually abused by a family acquaintance on at least
three occasions. Id. at 213. Carta was fifteen when he was forced to have sex with a 65-year old man at
least weekly for over three years. Id
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the sexual abuse, Carta began to engage inintiate sexual acts on his own
early in life. 94 He had his first relationship when he was 17 years old with a
boy of a similar age. 95 Carta started to accumulate a criminal history of
non-sex related offenses as an adolescent. He has committed a few sexual
offenses over his adult life, none of which he was convicted for or relate to
the underlying offense of his § 3553 sentence. 96 When Carta was in his
thirties he began using the Internet in search of young boys. 97
The crime resulting in Carta's criminal sentence was his first and only
conviction for a sex offense. 98 On April 9, 2002, he pled guilty to a single
count of Transportation of Child Pornography in the District of
Connecticut. 99 During his sentencing hearing he admitted that he began
viewing child pornography in 1995.100 Carta had between 10,000 and
20,000 images in his possession.ol He estimated that at some points he
spent 70 hours per week viewing child pornography.102 None of these facts
related to the charged crime, only his sentence. When later questioned,
however, he reduced that number to five hours per week.10 3 Based on the
sole charge of Transportation of Child Pornography Carta was sentenced to
60 months in prison and three years supervised release.104
B. Criminal Sentence

On April 9, 2002, Carta entered a guilty plea before the Honorable
Dominic Squatritol05 confessing to "one count of transportation of child
pornography ... and one count of criminal forfeiture."106 At the sentencing
94 Id When Carta was approximately 15 years old he shot another 15-year-old boy with a BB gun
when he refused to engage in oral sex. Id. Carta was able to convince the boy to do it and they engaged
in oral sex two times in the next five years. Id.
95 Id. Carta, then 24 years old, began a relationship with a 17-year-old female named Lucille,
whom he married one year later. Id. The marriage ended after nine months due to an affair. Id. Carta
later had a four-year relationship with another woman named Brenda. Id.
96 Id. He offered a 13-year-old boy oral sex in exchange for concert tickets. Id. Carta fondled an
18-year-old male who passed out from drug use in his van. Id at 214.
97 Id. at 214. At 31 years old, Carta described having a "boyfriend" who was 13. Id Eventually he
brought the boy with him from California to Connecticut to live with him. Id.
98 Id
99 Id
100 Id.
101 Id
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id
105 Transcript of Hearing at 27, United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210 (2009) (No.
3:02CR99) (D. Conn. April 9, 2002) (unpublished). Carta plead guilty to count one and two in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2253. Id.
106 Transcript of Hearing at 2-3, supra note 106.
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hearing six months later, the court considered multiple factors in
determining Carta's sentence, including the pre-sentence report by Mr.
Joseph Monesti.10 7 The pre-sentence report calculated a recommendation
for Carta's sentence.10 8 The court adopted the facts in the pre-sentence
report that neither party objected to.109
Counsel for Carta, Mr. John Francis O'Brien, objected to two
calculations contained in the pre-sentence report.o10 He argued that his
client did not have an "abusive or exploitive relationship with a minor" as
characterized by the report."I' O'Brien also argued that Carta's use of child
pornography was "not a systematic scheme" and thus he was not engaged
in the "barter of materials."ll 2 The court agreed with Mr. O'Brien and
concluded that Carta's activity did not fit within the category of sexual
abuse or exploitation of a minor under the sentencing guidelines.1 13 The
court did, however, disagree with O'Brien on the issue of barter of
materials and found that Carta "did distribute child pornography, quote, for
receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary
gain."I1 4 As a result of Carta's barter of materials, the court determined a
five level increase, under the sentencing guidelines, was necessary."t 5
The court considered many factors before imposing Carta's criminal
sentence. Some were the same factors later considered at his civil
commitment hearing. In addition to the pre-sentence report and the
sentencing guidelines, the court considered his criminal history and the
need to protect the public.11 6 As required under § 3553, Judge Squatrito
factored the need "to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant.""l 7 He said, "This is a very long rap sheet ... But, you've got to
protect society."' 1s He also said, "[t]he factors which a district court must
take into consideration in determining a particular sentence to be imposed
are stated in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553."119 Before sentencing Carta, the
Government made a 5KI motion for a downward departure from the
107
108
109
110
Ill
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id at 7.
Id. at8.
Id. at 11.
Id.
at8.
Id
Id at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id
Id at 13.
Id. at 29.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2006).
Transcript of Hearing at 29, supra note 106.
Id. at 39.
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sentencing guidelines.1 20 The Government explained that Carta was
"instrumental" in locating a man named Mark Ives, who was trading child
pornography.121 Finding Ives was extremely important to the Government
because he "had some indication on his computer that [Ives] was about to
adopt some boy in a foreign country."1 22 The court concluded that "a
downward departure is warranted in this case" and granted the
Government's motion. 123 As a result of the downward departure, his
sentence was reduced by more than two years.124
After evaluating the pre-sentence report, Carta's criminal history, the
5KI motion, and the statements of Carta and his attorney, Judge Squatrito
imposed a sentence of 60 months and three years supervised release.125
Special conditions were provided for Carta's supervised release.12 6 He
would be required to participate in various programs, including mental
health treatment, sex offender treatment, and substance abuse treatment, all
of which would further the goal of rehabilitation under § 3553.127 Another
condition of his supervised release was that he would not be allowed to be
with a child unless another adult were present.128 Finally, Judge Squatrito
explained to Carta what would happen if he violates his supervised release:
"the Court will be free to sentence you to additional time in prison, without
credit for time previously served on post release supervision, for a period of
as much as two years."' 29 On October 16, 2002, after considering the
factors listed in § 3553, the Judge imposed a sentence of five years prison
time and three years supervised release.130 Judge Squatrito recommended
Carta to be incarcerated at the Devens medical facility, which is classified
as an Administrative facility rather than a high security institution. 13 1
120 Id. at 19 (discussing the SKI motion made by the government for a downward departure from
the sentencing guidelines).
121 Id
122 Id
123 Id. at 42.
124 Id. at 51-53. The guidelines called for 92 to 115 months in prison before the SKI motion. Id. at
51. Carta was sentenced to 60 months in prison, thus his sentence was reduced by at least 32 months, or
2.6 years. Id. at 53.
125 Id. at 54.
126 Id. ("A special condition of supervised release will be that you not commit another federal,
state or local crime during the term of supervision.").
127 Id. at 54-55.
128 Id. at 55. ("Four. The defendant shall not be allowed to be in the company of any child under
the age of 18 years without another adult present. The adult supervisor shall be first approved by United
States Probation Office and the counselor for the sexual offender program.").
129 Id. at 56.
130 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2006).
131 See Transcript. of Hearing at 62, supra note 107; see also Federal Bureau of Prisons, FMC
Devens, http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dev/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
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C. Civil Commitment

Carta's marathon jail sentence was scheduled to end, but the Attorney
General exercised his power under § 4248 and certified Carta as "sexually
dangerous," thus allowing a district judge to stay his release.132 On June 4,
2009, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
a hearing to determine whether Carta fit within the definition of "sexually
dangerous."l 33 The court held that the government did not prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Carta was a "sexually dangerous person." 34
The court said that to civilly commit Carta "the Government must make
two primary showings: (1) that Respondent has 'engaged or attempted to
engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation' in the past; and (2)
that Respondent 'is sexually dangerous to others.""135 To determine if
Carta was sexually dangerous, the court required the Government to prove
"(a) that Respondent 'suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder'; and (b) that Respondent 'would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released."'l 36 The second prong of the analysis is nearly identical to a
factor considered at sentencing: "protect[ing] the public from further
crimes of the defendant."1 37 Therefore, the purpose underlying Carta's §
4248 civil commitment hearing is the same purpose that was considered at
his § 3553 criminal sentence.
At trial, the Government experts testified that some of Carta's sexual
contact with minors could be considered child molestation under § 4247.138
The Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has defined the term child molestation to
include "any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature with, or sexual
exploitation of, a person under the age of 18 years." 39 Based on expert
testimony and the BOP's definition of child molestation, the court found
that Carta's conduct satisfied the child molestation element of civil
commitment under §§ 4247 and 4248.140 However, the conduct that the
132 See United States v. Carta, Docket # 1:07-cv-12064-PBS (Mar. 9, 2007).
133 United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 229 (D. Mass. 2009).
134 Id
135 Id. at 221 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §4247(a)(5)).
136 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §4247(a)(5)).
137 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(C) (2006).
138 Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 221. Carta's attorney argued that he had not committed child
molestation because the minors he sexually abused were mature because they were not prepubescent.
Id.
139 Id (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 549.93 (2008)).
140 Id. (holding that Carta's "sexual activity with a thirteen-year-old male whom he coerced into
engaging in sexual activity in exchange for concert tickets when Respondent was twenty-eight"
constituted child molestation under the Act).
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experts testified about took place prior to Carta's sentence for
transportation of child pornography and thus the sentencing court had an
opportunity and did factor in his sexual conduct with minors when
calculating his sentence.
Ultimately, Carta spent a year and a half in jail beyond the length of his
criminal sentence, while he waited to be told that he was not a sexually
dangerous person. The court held that the Government failed to meet its
burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard that Carta
currently suffers from "a serious mental illness, abnormality or
disorder." 41 Several witnesses testified to Carta's condition. Each party
called an expert witness. Carta's psychologist assigned by the BOP, Dr. J.
Michael Wood, testified that Carta "enjoy[ed] therapy because it was the
first time he could discuss his problems freely."1 42 Dr. Amy Phenix, an
expert for the Government, testified that Carta is "sexually dangerous" and,
thus, satisfied the criteria to be civilly committed under the Act. 143
Pursuant to § 4247, the court appointed Dr. Leonard Bard as an expert at
the request of Carta.144 Dr. Bard found that Carta was not considered
sexually dangerous under the definition in § 4247.145
In an attempt to diagnosis Carta with a "serious mental illness,
abnormality or disorder,"l 46 the Government focused on diagnosing him
with "paraphilia NOS: hebephilia."l 47 The Government's expert, Dr.
Phenix, described a person suffering from "hebephilia" as someone having
a "sexual interest in post-pubescent adolescents age seventeen and
under."1 48 This diagnosis is not one found within the DSM-IV-TR,149
which "is a classification manual that contains all of the known research on

141 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (a)(6)).
142 Id. at 215.
143 Id. at212.
144 Id. ("Respondent also called Dr. Randall Kent Wallace, who testified about the psychological
services Respondent would be expected to receive on supervised release, and Paul Collette, a U.S.
Probation Officer who provided testimony regarding Respondent's anticipated conditions of release.").
'45 Id.
146 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a) (2006).
147 Carta,620 F. Supp. 2d at 222. "The term 'paraphilia' refers to an individual who experiences
over a period of at least six months, intense, recurrent, sexually arousing fantasies, urges, or behavior
involving: (1) non-human objects; (2) humiliation of oneself or one's partner; or (3) children and other
non-consenting person." Id. at 217. Dr. Phenix diagnosed Carta with "paraphilia not otherwise specified
with a descriptor of hebephilia." Id. at 223. She said that "paraphilia NOS diagnosis is proper whenever
a patient meets the criteria for paraphilia but none of the specified categories of the disorder applies."
Id.
148 Id. at 222.
149 Id. at 223. The DSM-IV-TR is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition, Text Revision. Id.

1046

JOURNAL OF CIVLRIGHIS & ECONOAICDEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 26:4

mental disorders." 5 0 The court appointed psychologist, Dr. Bard, stated
that a diagnosis not found in the DSM-IV-TR is usually not accepted by the
psychiatric and psychological community.15 1 Accordingly, the court did not
find Carta to fall within the definition of paraphilia NOS: hebephilia.1 52
The court found two other problems with Dr. Phenix's diagnosis. First,
"hebephilia" and "paraphilia NOS: hebephilia" have no consistent criteria
to use when diagnosing someone.1 5 3 Second, the Government did not show
that these diagnoses are supported by research in the field of psychology.l 5 4
Despite Dr. Phenix testifying that "some" peer reviewed articles support
hebephilia as a diagnosis, Dr. Bard stated that there is limited and
problematic peer reviewed research supporting hebephilia.155 The articles
the Government submitted to support a diagnosis of hebephilia were
published by Dr. Blanchard and Dr. Cantor.156 Dr. Bard criticized the
research of Blanchard/Cantor because they failed to include a control group
and eliminated significant portions of the samples.1 57 The court said "[i]n
sum, the testimony of the psychologists in this case and the research
presented to them at trial indicate that hebephilia is not generally
recognized as a serious mental illness by the psychological and psychiatric
communities."158 In holding that the Government did not satisfy its
burden, the court emphasized the importance of a high standard in civil
commitment proceedings because the Due Process Clause requires such
protection. 15 9 Although the standard in civil commitment hearings is high,
it is not as high as "beyond a reasonable doubt" which is the standard used
to convict the defendant of the crime which underlies the potential civil
commitment. Thus, it is easier to civilly commit individuals, despite the
lack of a new offense, than it is to convict them of a crime.
150 Id. The DSM-IV-TR is relied on in the field of clinical psychology because it "allows mental
health workers to have an agreement on various mental disorders." Id.
151 Id
152 Id. "But there is at least some question whether the general criteria for paraphilia are in fact
applicable to Respondent." Id. "The DSM-IV-TR criteria thus do not clearly support a paraphilia NOS
diagnosis for an individual who is sexually aroused by post-pubescent minors." Id. at 224.
153 Id. at 224. "In short, the term 'hebephilia' may have some value as a general descriptor of
sexual interest in adolescents, but the lack of any clear criteria in the proposed definitions demonstrates
that hebephilia is not a workable diagnosis." Id. at 225.
154 id. at 226.

155 Id
156 Id.

157 Id. Dr. Bard also criticized their research because both Dr. Blanchard and Dr. Cantor are on the
editorial board of the journal that published their research. Id.
158 Id
159 Id. at 222 ("'[TIhe individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of
such weight and gravity' that this standard is required not only by the Act, but by the Due Process
clause of the Constitution.") (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
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The third element of civil commitment, serious difficulty from refraining
from sexually violent conduct, was not addressed because the government
lost their case on the second prong.160 However, it can be reasonably
inferred that the court's analysis would focus on the need to protect the
public from Carta if he could not refrain from sexually violent conduct,
which is an element also considered at a § 3553 sentencing hearing. The
court concluded that the Government failed to meet its burden of clear and
convincing evidence and did not civilly commit Carta.161
D. Carta: Two Hearings,Same Purposes
The hearing before Judge Squatrito for Carta's criminal sentence and the
opinion issued by Judge Tauro in the civil commitment proceeding have
numerous similarities and underlying motives behind their rationales. There
are two constant themes seen throughout the criminal sentencing hearing
and the civil commitment opinion: protecting society from further
crimes 162 and ensuring the defendant receives treatment so he does not
commit future crimes. 163 As previously discussed, these are the same
themes found in the text and legislative intent of §§ 3553 and 4248.164
Even though Carta's sentencing and civil commitment hearings were
conducted in front of different judges, pursuant to different statutes, more
than six years apart, they show that the judiciary considers the same exact
factors in both hearings.
Throughout Todd Carta's sentencing and civil commitment hearings
relating to possession and trading of child pornography, both judges
expressed a serious concern that Carta could potentially hurt people in the
future. In the proceeding held before Judge Squatrito to determine Carta's
sentence for his criminal conduct, "protecting the public" was referenced at
least eight times throughout the sixty-page transcript.165 The consistent
reference by Judge Squatrito indicates his concern for public safety as a top

160
161
162
163

Carta,620 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
Id.
See Transcript of Hearing 29, supranote 106.
Id. at 41.

164 See 18 U.S.C. §3553 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. §4248 (2006).
165 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 106. "My job here is to also protect society." Id. at 18; "I
have to protect society." Id; "But, you've got to protect society." Id. at 29; "But I've got to protect other
people." Id. at 31; "[B]ut I have to protect other people." Id. at 31-32; "Quite truthfully I'm just afraid
for society as a whole." Id. at 34; "I also want to comment about the danger to community and danger
to children." Id. at 37; "A criminal sentence can protect the public by immobilizing an offender and
isolating him or her from society, absolutely protecting society from the offender during the period of
incarceration." Id. at 40.
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priority in determining Carta's sentence. 166 Judge Squatrito said,
"[r]ealistically the ultimate role here is deterrence, protect society. The only
way to do that is put him in jail."1 6 7 Later he said, "Imay feel for you as a
human being, which I do, but my job is to feel for all of the other human
beings out there."1 68 More than six years later an opinion was written by
Judge Tauro regarding Carta's potential civil commitment.169 The opinion
focused mainly on the Government's alleged diagnosis of hebephilia. 70
However, specifically referenced in the section on the failure of the
Government to meet its burden, the court says, "[i]n doing so, this court
recognizes both the seriousness of Respondent's criminal conduct and the
Government's strong interest in protecting post-pubescent minors from
sexual coercion."1 71 The sixty-page transcript from the sentencing hearing
in the District of Connecticut and Judge Tauoro's opinion from the civil
commitment hearing in the District of Massachusetts both indicate
protecting the public from Carta was one of the main concerns for both
judges.
The other factor heavily considered by the district courts when
considering Carta's case was the need to provide him with treatment to
potentially rehabilitate and/or cure his sexual disorder, and mental health
challenges. During sentencing for Carta's guilty plea, Judge Squatrito
discussed his concern that Carta would be put back in jail if he did not
correct his problems. 172 He continued to express his concern for helping
Carta with his problems when he said, "[t]hen also there's the general
purpose of rehabilitation that will provide you with education or vocational
training or other medical or other training. In your case that may be just as
important as anything." 73 Finally, three of the seven conditions Judge
Squatrito imposed on Carta's supervised release related to helping him
recover. 174 In the opinion issued by Judge Tauro for Carta's civil
166 Id
167 Id. at 29. (Emphasis added).
168 Id.at 36.
169 See Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
170 Id. at 222.
171 Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
172 See Transcript of Hearing at 18, supra note 106. ("Unfortunately somehow you've got to
correct this behavior over time. You just have to do it. Because even if you went, get out of jail, you'll
be followed and they're going to be aware of everything you do and you will just be brought back in
again.")'
173 Id. at41.
174 See id at 54-55. "One. The defendant shall participate in a program approved by the United
States Probation Office for mental health treatment, either inpatient or outpatient, with a specific
concentration of anger management counseling." Id. at 54; "Two. The defendant shall participate in a
program approved by the United States Probation Office for sex offender treatment with a therapist who
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commitment hearing he stated, "[t]he civil commitment regime, in contrast,
if it is to maintain its non-punitive character, must concern itself not with
punishment wrongdoing but with commitment and treatment of offenders
suffering from serious mental illness and actual volitional impairment." 175
At both the criminal sentencing and civil commitment hearings, the judges
factored in the likelihood of finding Carta appropriate treatment while
determining his fate.
The case of United States v. Carta is merely an example of a case that
exemplifies the unnecessary and duplicative nature behind the civil
commitment statute. 176 The fact that § 4248 is duplicative is a problem
because it implicated the double jeopardy clause and confines defendants,
such as Carta, for a period well beyond their criminal sentence. Carta was
fortunate enough to escape civil commitment because the Government
failed to meet its burden. 177 However, he remained in the custody of the
United States almost two years beyond his scheduled release date. 178 As
seen in Carta, the sentencing factors listed in § 3553 can achieve the
intended goals of civil commitment.
CONCLUSION

This Note argues that the statute, which provides for the civil
commitment of sex offenders, should be eliminated. It has shown that when
interpreting the language of each statute, the texts contain many
similarities. It also advocates that the legislative history indicate that both
statutes were intended to serve identical purposes. Finally, it showed when
§§ 3553 and 4248 were applied to a sex offender two different judges
expressed similar concerns when deciding the criminal sentence and civil
commitment.
Despite the obvious duplicative nature of § 4248 the question remains,
how can this problem be fixed? Will the repeal of § 4248 solve this
dilemma? Does § 3553 need to be amended to better serve society? The
concerns currently associated with § 4248 justify its repeal. The solution
is licensed and experienced in the treatment of individuals with sexual disorders." Id.; "Three. The
defendant shall participate in a program approved by the United States Probation Office for substance
abuse treatment, either inpatient or outpatient, which shall include random testing." Id at 55.
175 Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
176 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
177 Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
178 See United States v. Carta, Docket # 1:07-cv-12064-PBS (March 9, 2007). On March 9, 2007,
the United States certified Carta as "sexually dangerous" and thus stayed his release. On June 4, 2009,
Judge Joseph Tauro entered a judgment and memorandum finding that Carta was not considered
"sexually dangerous" within the meaning of § 4247.
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may not seem apparent to many but the duplicative nature of § 4248 makes
the decision obvious. To ease concerns about this challenging decision, an
amendment to § 3553 to clearly incorporate § 4248 provides an ideal
solution.

